Chapter 4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter will critically examine the theoretical framework as well as discuss some relevant literature that will inform the research theme and arguments. The goal is to identify the gaps in the literature as well as incorporate discourses to contribute to the theoretical discussions. As noted in the Introduction, I have chosen a critical approach as my theoretical framework. Thus, I have selected the theories of power by Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu; all three were interested in power and its relations in the role of government. This Literature review is divided into three parts: The first is a presentation of the theoretical framework, in the theories of power by three theorists and their relevance in Samoa's political context. The second part focuses on the key concepts – power and state - and a review of the international literature. The third part examines the local literature. The overall aim is to provide a sound and comprehensive overview of a framework that is responsive to the demands of the task.

4.1 Part 1: A critical and collaborative framework

As noted, three theorists have been selected to provide the basis of my theoretical framework. All three share common values of critical theory tradition, wherein power structures are critiqued in relation to society's problems basically. While distinct in each own rights, the point of interest is with the shared concerns rather than disagreements. More importantly the strength in collaboration when one complements the other. Also given the scope of the space of scrutiny as demanded by critical theory tradition – totality of society – it means that a variety of stances can offer the best for such framework to be accommodating; it also provides a more balanced assessment of power relations (Graham, 2005; Kendie, 2006; Linklater, 2007). On that understanding, the three theorists are discussed within a wider context of relations with other critical theory traditions, CT and CDA for example. Such a critical integrated approach tends to provide a more authentic framework to understanding the Samoan social reality. Such reality will be revealed by measuring society's consensual truths against actual social conditions (Friesen, 2008).

4.1.1 Critical Theory

Critical Theory (hereafter CT as a theory) widely refers to a school of thought that stresses a reflective assessment and critique of society and culture by applying knowledge from the social sciences and humanities to help communities understand and if necessary, challenge power relationships (Denzin, Lincoln & Smith, 2008; Thompson, 2017, Horkheimer, 1982). It has a dual meaning in terms of origins and histories: the first originated in sociology and the second in literary criticism (Horkheimer, 1982). It is used and applied as a term to describe a theory founded upon critique; thus, social theorist, Max Horkheimer, described a theory as critical insofar as it seeks "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them" (ibid., 1982, p. 244). CT has a dual purpose according to Horkheimer; first, it should be directed at the totality of society in its historical specificity; secondly, it should improve understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences (ibid.). Primarily Critical Theory maintains that ideology is the principal obstacle to human emancipation. Critical Theory focused on language, symbolism, communication, and social construction. It has been applied within the social sciences as a critique of social construction and postmodern society (Agger, 2012).

Linklater (2007) commented on the advantages of Critical Theory. First, CT as opposed to positivism argued that knowledge does not arise from a neutral engagement of subject with an objective reality, rather it reflects pre-existing social purposes and interests. As such, claims about neutrality often conceal the role that knowledge plays in reproducing unsatisfactory social arrangements (ibid.). He viewed their relevancy in the critique of neo-realism, and for the sake of international relations 'salvaged social discourse from familiar pitfalls of the early twentieth century idealism'. Secondly, critical theory is opposed to empirical claims about the social world and its structures as immutable. Immutability implies that structured inequalities of power and wealth are supported whereas in principle this can be altered. Critical theory promotes the idea of a new form of political community in which individuals and groups can achieve higher levels of freedom and equality (ibid.).

Thirdly, critical theory, having learnt and able to overcome the weaknesses inherent in Marxism, moved on to construct a historical sociology with an emancipatory purpose. In the works of Habermas for instance, a project of reconstructing historical materialism

is significant according to Linklater (2007). This project denies that class power is the fundamental form of social exclusion or that the production is the key determinant of society and history. Instead, Post-Marxist critical theory has extended conventional Marxist analysis to blend in with local and universal discourses (ibid.). As a result, other new possibilities open for constructing such a historical sociology with much human purpose. Fourthly, Critical Theory according to Linklater can judge social arrangements by their capacity to embrace open dialogue with others. It believes in a pragmatic approach and use of unconstrained discourse to examine any boundaries or possibilities. Including in the task is the role of discourse in the study of international relations (2007).

4.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

CDA is described as "a type of discourse analysis research that studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in social and political contexts (van Dijk, 2004, p. 352). In other terms CDA looks at the way language is employed and manipulated, to show how ideological presuppositions are hidden underneath the surface structures of language choices in text (ibid.). As van Dijk pointed out, CDA unlike other analyses explicitly places itself in oppositional stance. Irrespective of which theories and methods its scholars indulge themselves with, all are bound by a concern for the investigation of the reproduction of ideology in language (van Dijk, 2004; Fairclough, 1992). Henderson (2005) argued that CDA has offered the researcher an opportunity to question the takenfor-grantedness of language and enabling explorations of how texts represent the world in particular ways according to particular interests. As a research method, CDA provides opportunities to consider the relationships between discourse and society, between text and context, and that between language and power (Fairclough, 2001).

Janks (1997) described this use of language as a form of social practice. Because a language is tied to specific historical contexts, it then provides the means by which social relations are reproduced or contested. As well, serving various interests, language in this sense is about serving human interests (ibid.). The questions are: How are such interests positioned in the text? Whose interest is negated in the relations? What are the consequences of such positioning? The role of analysis is to seek to find out such implications in power relations (ibid.; Fairclough, 2001). Wodak (2001) views the role of CDA as a closer look into institutional, political, gender, and media discourses to find out how

certain social groups may be ill-presented or misrepresented in all these various types of discourses.

As a tool, CDA examines patterns of access and control over contexts, genres, text and talk, their properties, as well as discursive strategies of mind control. CDA studies a discourse and its functions in society and the way society, and especially forms of inequality, are expressed, represented, legitimated, or reproduced in text and talk (van Dijk, 1995).

In sum, CDA is of the view that language and social reality are directly related. Language is an active player in the way people and societies interact through any manner of relationship (McGregor, 2003); that the relationship between the linguistic forms and ideas of reality are binding and thus makes language part of a wider ideological process in the representation and construction of meanings (ibid, 2003). In turn, any political discourse is loaded with meaning that is ideological. McGregor (2003) argued then that the main role of CDA "is to uncloak the hidden power relations, largely constructed through language, and to demonstrate and challenge social inequities reinforced and reproduced" (McGregor, 2003; Wodak, 2001).

4.2 Gramsci and cultural hegemony

Antonio Gramsci's contribution to political power understanding revolves around his best-known theory of cultural hegemony (Ramos, 1980; Kendie, 2006). With much support, his ongoing relevance to studying modern society is based on his interpretation of power relations in a situation where capitalism thrives, and class struggle is in retreat (Ramos, 1980). Such relations can be explained in the idea of a 'third face of power', or 'the invisible power'; or as Heywood (1994) put it, the pervasive power of ideology, values and beliefs in reproducing class relations and concealing contradictions (1994). Marx recognised the concern, that while economic exploitation is the driver behind capitalism, the system is reinforced by a domination of ruling class ideas and values – hence Engel's famous concern that 'false consciousness' would keep the working class from recognising and rejecting their oppression (Heywood, 1994). Gramsci took these ideas further and developed them in the solitude of prison from which two famous concepts emerged—hegemony and manufacture of consent (ibid.).

First, the concept of hegemony which according to Gramsci is about predominant control by consent. It is a condition in which a ruling class exercises a political, intellectual, and moral role of leadership within a hegemonic system, underpinned by a common worldview or organic ideology (Ramos, 1980). As Ramos put it, the exercise of this role on the ethico-political as well as on the economic plane involves the execution of a process of intellectual and moral reform. This is where the previous ideological terrains are transformed and redefined (Ramos, ibid.). This transformation or redefinition is achieved through a rearticulation of ideological elements into a new worldview which then serves as the unifying principle for a new collective will. It is this new worldview, which unifies classes into a new hegemonic bloc that constitutes the new organic ideology. It is not a worldview that is imposed, but a transformation in the realms of moral and intellect. (ibid.). Gramsci would like to emphasise that in this transformation, there is no complete replacement of the previously dominant worldview; rather, the new worldview is a co-construction of the hegemonic class and its consensual subalterns, out of the existing ideological elements held by the latter in their discourses (Ramos, 1980; Heywood, 1994).

Cultural hegemony hence according to Gramsci, is not about subjugation or domination in the old sense; rather it is power domination in a subtle form; in ways by which authority maintains power by having others give their consent. While domination denotes absolute control, hegemony on the other hand signifies the effect of influence, patronage or leadership (Kendie, 2006). Unlike reward power, which is the opposite of coercive power, cultural hegemony, is about a mental disposition in the realm of ideas and knowledge, that is, in most cases, devoid of 'critical consciousness' (Freire,1970). The state is the dominant player in power relations, with the capacity to influence the people to believe and do what they are expected to believe and do (Gramsci, 1971). State institutions are the means by which this is carried out through its normalization programmes (ibid.).

'Manufacture of consent' is a Gramscian concept which refers to the forces by which a dominant class or state sustains its hegemony through the consent of other classes or the public (1971). Gramsci has given examples of such institutions sponsored by the state like education for instance, which serve as agents in manufacturing consent (ibid.). He argued that the current education system promotes 'cultural educational hegemony'

through an emphasis on content and tasks and expectations for learners (Manojan, 2019; Dawson, 1982; Fontana, 2002). Education is a powerful tool by which ideas are disseminated, most of these ideas find their ways into government policies, academic discourses, the news bulletin in the shop to children's literature in the classroom (Fontana, 2002). With the predominant status of capitalism and neo-liberalism in the world today such values are propagated through international networks of capitalist institutions - social, political and economic (Freire, 1970).

4.2.1   Role of ideology

Ideology is a key concept in Gramsci's writings and provides the basis of his political thoughts on power relations (Gramsci, 1999, 1988; Ramos, 1980). While Marx viewed ideology as a form of false consciousness, he failed to see socialism as a true form of ideology (ibid.). Gramsci's experience involving own country proved that Marx's penchant for historical factors determining the outcome did not apply in other cases (Gramsci, 1999; Richards, 1993). While disparity in the relations of production was evident, capitalism still abounded, there was no class struggle. Gramsci would end up seeing a new light in the old concept (Richards, 1993). As such, ideology is a tool that can be used to advance the people's own 'ideologies' and political action (Kertzer, 1979).

It means that the struggle against the ruling class can also be waged at the ideological front. In more direct terms, ideology is a factor in its own right, it is the key to understanding power relations according to Gramsci (1971). Hence Gramsci's conception of hegemony, based on his general observations of other forms of social control that are less repressive or agreeable with societal norms, helped to explain what Marxism could not (Kendie, 2006). These other forms replaced the military based rule and coercive state control that was prominent in Weber's thinking, or the reactionary response known with staunch Marxism (ibid.). Through the rule of 'hegemony' the ruling class is able to exert own control in ways that are considered legitimate by the people (Gramsci, 1988).

4.2.2   Relationship between ideology and social order

Having constituted the political importance of ideology, Gramsci then looked at how ideology relates within the social order. Marxist ideology was confined as it were to a reductionist view about class struggle and each group holding onto own ideas that describe own approach to others as confrontational (Ramos, 1980). Rather Gramsci's understanding was in terms of practices, politico-ideological discourses and elements (ibid.). He used the term "terrain" of practices, principles and dogmas having a material and institutional nature. They constitute individual subjects and social agents which are instrumental in spreading own ideas across the substructure and the ideological superstructure (ibid.).

Hence his ideas of organic ideology and organic intellectuals. First, organic ideology, described in terms of the organic arrangement of all ideological elements into a unified system by means of hegemonic rule, is the work of the organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 1999; Ramos, 1980). Such ideology is the binding force of society by means of complex arrangements. Among its features is the ability of its proponents to successfully articulate and express the more essential elements of the ideological discourses pertaining to the subaltern classes. Organic ideology is diffused throughout civil society by the political consent of all classes and by common virtues of socio-economic relations (ibid.). This becomes a hegemonic principle of the state or the ruling class, accepted by all as 'common sense.' Such common sense pervades and prevails in the works of civil institutions and structures such as family, churches, the media, schools, the legal system, trade unions, public and private associations (ibid.).

Organic intellectuals are found in all groups and classes and more directly related to the economic structure of their society; compared to traditional intellectuals whose members are identified with civil society mainly (Gramsci, 1988). The latter group represents traditions and the past. Both groups in their specialized skills, knowledge and professional impartiality put them in good stead within the system. But it is the organic intellectuals who are considered more useful in the struggle to achieve counterhegemony (Gramsci, 1999). By their own social backgrounds many of them are more empathetic to the common people, they serve as agents for the relaying of subaltern ideals and aspirations into the public discourse. Both the organic and traditional intellectuals

however can collaborate at a political level for the common good of all classes (Karpova et al.; 2016; Gramsci, 1988).

4.3 Bourdieu's contribution

Bourdieu's contribution to power understanding is significant (Navarro, 2005). A foundational principle in his theory is the notion that culture is not only the very ground for human interaction but is also an especial terrain of domination (ibid.). He argued that all symbolic systems are anchored in culture and thus determine our understanding of reality. Not only that culture and its effect ensure communication and interaction, but they also create and maintain social hierarchies. "Culture, in the form of dispositions, objects, institutions, language and so on, mediates social practices by connecting people and groups to institutionalized hierarchies. Thus, it necessarily embodies power relations" (p. 15).

4.3.1 Bourdieu's theory of habitus

The concept of habitus is identified with Bourdieu's works and claimed to be the core concept in his political philosophy (Edgerton, 2014). Used by Bourdieu to address the sociological problem of agency and structure (Lacroix, 2012), habitus refers to the physical embodiment of cultural capital in the habits, skills, and dispositions that people possess due to their life experiences (Bourdieu, 1986). These are deeply ingrained in a person's body and psyche, he argued. Thus, a person will generate agency and reproduce social structure by means of these human attributes and learned skills; for example, transforming a political idea into an organised movement or turning an individual habit into a group culture. Habitus is composed of "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 66). Physiologically and psychologically, it is a natural way of responding at the human level. This idea of a collective response or tendency defines communities at many and various levels of interests, behaviours, and ways of thinking. Socialization makes cultures out of people; thus, a powerful force in the production/reproduction of habitus.

Each habitus attaches own value system on its subjects depending on their social fields or the environment in which they operate (Lacroix, 2012). This is where their social positions are located. Because cultural capital is considered of high value in many

habitus its impact on human perception and conditioning is complete. Thus, what is valued within a habitus is conferred through its institutions such as the family, school, church for example (ibid.).

4.3.2 Bourdieu's theory of capital

Therefore, habitus features directly in Bourdieu's conception of power as symbolic (1979). He articulated this in his theory of capital. There are three forms: 1. Economic capital 2. Social capital, and 3. Cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Economic capital refers to material assets that are 'immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights' (Bourdieu 1986, p. 247). His definition of social capital is, 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition' (Bourdieu 1986, p. 247).

Social capital is considered as a collective feature of society (Song, 2013); a conceptual construct based on the idea of the value of social relationships and networks that complement the economic capital for economic growth of an organization (Bhandari & Yasunobu, 2009). Bourdieu described it as a network-based resource that is available in interpersonal relationships (ibid.). At least four types can be identified (Carpiano, 2006): social support, social leverage, informal social control, and community organisation participation. Bourdieu's context of social capital is at the group level, which space enables group members to function much more effectively. When relations are well nurtured, capital is amplified which end results are solidarity, group cohesion, empowerment, and so forth. In his words, many requirements for social life are accessible only "*via the virtues of social capital or the relations, obligations, trust and reciprocity inherent in it*" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 252).

As Bourdieu put it, 'Such virtues do not occur instantaneously but are products of the investment of both time and energy before and beyond their use. Such acts are not guaranteed, nor are they sealed with legal contractual arrangements and do not appear to have imminent results. Time lag is the key factor that transmutes a simple act of goodwill, a favour from a stranger, a smile, a gift, a greeting into recognition between parties. What was at the time a pure and simple debt becomes across time "*the recognition of a non-specific indebtedness*" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 252, cited in Atkins, 1999). To

this Bourdieu gives the label, 'gratitude.' Social groups which show strong signs of solidarity are the ones who invest more in their social relations. Thus, there is an ongoing demand to invest in social capital (tending to relations, building trust for example) or it will deteriorate (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu stressed the importance of investment of time and energy to the maintenance of social capital, where every member of a group plays a part.

> The foundation of social capital is investment of time and energy based on a basic premise of trust to allow for recognition, more trust, good faith, and reciprocity to transpire. Such virtues are invested without the expectation of prompt or immediate returns, but an investment strategy for the future or indeed a response from the past that self-generates as an investment for the future. A lack of response or input from other parties, or indeed an abuse of the resource, reduces the levels of social capital between the actors and so self-regulates its own losses. Stocks of social capital not constantly nurtured or invested will deteriorate (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 252).

Cultural capital refers to the sum of symbolic elements such as skills, credentials, material belongings, aesthetic taste, mannerisms, even posture and attire (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural capital comprises a person's education profile and social status and privileges arisen from. Bourdieu proposed three forms of cultural capital: Embodied, Objectified, Institutionalised (Bourdieu, 1986). For examples, to be skilful in an art, language or occupation is capital embodied. To own an expensive car is capital objectified. To hold a university qualification or a civic title or membership of a reputable organisation is capital institutionalised.

Cultural capital is acquired through socialization to a dominant culture and its higher traditions (ibid.). By a person's intellectual disposition or common rapport with like-minded individuals (habitus) he/she takes on the values, attitudes, or traditions of any such group. For example, mastery of a specialized language of a higher culture is a way of embodying cultural capital, thus enhancing a person's social status (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Language then is not just a means of communication but a medium of power (ibid.). Possession of such cultural capital leads to formal recognition in society and much better chances in the job market, with the assurance of social privileges attached to. Cultural capital can be converted to economic capital simply by describing it to the seller in the language of power (ibid.).

4.3.3 Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power

Because cultural capital is symbolic capital (prestige, honour, recognition, etc.) then naturally they are more dominant in determining how hierarchies of power are situated and reproduced across societies. Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power refers to the 'tacit almost unconscious' domination of cultural/social modes in the everyday social habits (1986, p. 47). He used the term 'distinction' to differentiate social spaces and the power relations that go with these. Belonging to a certain group is evidence of a person's social distinction or his/her symbolic identity, manifested in lifestyles, tastes, language, decorum and so forth. Politically, symbolic power accounts for the discipline in maintaining places in a social hierarchy (Giddens, 1973). The effects of symbolic power on social relations can be understood along this line of accepting the status quo without question.

Granted, while everyone has some form of cultural capital, some are more recognizable than others. The more recognizable person enjoys such status at the expense of others who are less identifiable or none. Thus, when Bourdieu asserted that power relations are misrecognised, he meant that society has 'consecrated' such with or without the knowing of those involved (ibid, 1986). He stated, "Symbolic power is the power to make things with words," (1989, p. 23). Deference to those in power reinforces their recognized statuses or 'consecrate things that are already there' (ibid., p. 23). The social practice of greeting and saluting people reinforces these conventions daily. Power differential between social groups leads to symbolic violence, Bourdieu argued (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). So, when the more powerful seek to alter the actions of those with less power, they have symbolically exercised violence. And because some statuses are higher and more recognizable than others, cultural capital then is a major source of social inequality (ibid.).

4.4 Michel Foucault

Any reference to Michel Foucault is daunting basically for many reasons as those who studied him pointed out. Discourses in relation to those reasons are ongoing and is not in the scope of this research. Regardless of the polarization of opinions, there are strong proponents of his views and political philosophy, nevertheless. Even Foucault's political philosophy by its own merits and entirety is not the aim. The purpose rather is to provide a summative reference overview of Foucault's ideas on power relations that concern more with the thesis objectives.

Michel Foucault[22] was a renowned French historian and philosopher whose ideas on power had much impact on political theorizing and understanding of modern society in terms of power relations. His popular appeal across disciplines and cross-cultural references speaks for his intellectual versatility and relevancy in many and varied situations (Taylor, 2011). Foucault's views on power and its relations are considered highly relevant in describing Samoa's power situation also. Basic to his philosophy is the assumption that human knowledge and existence are profoundly historical (Blackburn, 2008). The historical man is political. The political man lives for the present moment (Foucault, 1991). The political man is motivated by power as much as he is subjected by the forces that arise in its wake (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy).[23] Power according to Foucault is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge. Hence, human knowledge, or its forms required to effect power, plays a central role in the way power works, always in relations, for constructive ends or otherwise (ibid.). This constructive role of power has been his focal point of research interest, challenging the idea that power is essentially corrupt and negative (ibid.).

4.4.1 Foucaultian Discourse Analysis

Inspired by the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and critical theory (Wooffitt, 2005), FDA is a form of discourse analysis which focused on power relationships as expressed through language and practices (Given, 2008). A distinct characteristic is the stress on power relationships (ibid.). As such the analysis will look at how figures in authority use language to express their dominance or demand respect from others (Ferreirinha, 2010). Conversely, the way language is used as a form of resistance

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[22] As profiled by The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd Revision.
[23] Foucault was influenced by the political thought of Nietszche who maintained that man is motivated solely by political power. This is articulated in his book The Will to Power (1901).

against authority (Given, 2008). A researcher will apply FDA to find out how the social world is shaped/ constructed by language and how such activity affects power relationships (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008).

4.4.2 Biopolitics & Biopower

According to Foucault there was a time when power was centralized in the figure of a sovereign authority, who used threat and physical violence to control the population (1988). Until the emergence of a new form of authority around the end of the 18th century; the state. Its primary concern was the care of the human population. By then new mechanisms wrought by new technologies of power have emerged to cater for the management of human lives. Foucault used the term biopolitics to describe this new phenomenon. Biopolitics is a government rationality based on the use of this technology of power as a means of mass control through state regulation (Foucault, 1988). It is about the control of an entire population through the application of this technology on the individual or the human body (Kelly, 2014). Such application he gave the name biopower. This new form of power coalesced around two poles, the first involves the efficient management of people's daily lives, for example, in the regulation of personal information such as dates of birth, death, sickness, hardships and so on. The rationale behind is the fostering and promotion of life as in population management, promotion of public health for example (ibid.). The ascendancy of the modern welfare state is the legacy of this phenomenon (Berend, 2005).

The second pole he gave the label disciplinary power, which target is the human body and how it can be manipulated and trained for political ends (Foucault, 1982; Kelly, 2014). It does so through the 'totalizing power' of state truth and political implication, enforced by its institutions, a process whereby human biology and state politics intertwine (ibid.). Prisons, factories, military, hospitals, schools act as 'techniques of power' to provide such discipline en masse and serve the goals of social order. In more direct terms, the individual by his or her body has become the business of the state; an object for examination and constant surveillance through the techniques of power and their regulatory processes (Foucault, 1979). And because of the shift in outlook from disciplinary to knowledge power, the people are attuned to accept their being disciplined by the state tacitly in these new ways. Foucault maintained that the modern state has integrated the old techniques of power of the church into own practice. It is given the name

pastoral power, providing the example in the church's confessional rites to which people are subjected mentally and psychologically.

> it cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It is linked with a production of truth, the truth of the individual himself" (Foucault, 1982, p. 783).

The constant surveillance of the population has become the legacy of the modern state. This is the disciplinary role of power, subtly demonstrated that it is hardly noticeable, with own regimes of truth in support, in which state institutions such as prisons, hospitals, schools, military, play leading roles. For instance, Samoa's serious commitment to safeguarding their intellectual properties in family and village genealogies, and the way these have ended up in the safekeeping of the state, attested to this subtle manoeuvring since the colonial administrations. Such legacy in Samoa's own biopower continued with its modern bureaucracy and functions. This will be discussed in more details in chapters 9 and 10 – analysis and discussion.

4.4.3   On power and its constitution

Foucault's noted maxim that 'power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but it comes from everywhere' is definitive (1979, p. 93), as well as problematic for the same reason, as many critics of Foucault would contend; but there is no question of its revolutionary appeal. He was against the old idea of power as a right or possession of an individual or selected group; rather he argued that power is diffuse, embodied, and enacted; discursive rather than purely coercive (Gaventa, 2003). Power pervades society. And because it comes from everywhere it is neither an agency nor a structure. How then can it be understood and analysed? Power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding, and truth, he argued (Foucault, 1984). By truth, he refers to a country's political discourse, reflected in the values espoused and sanctioned through the word and social practices of a people.

> Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true' (Foucault, 1984, pp. 72-73).

By regimes of truth, Foucault refers to the results of scientific discourse and institutional knowledge, reinforced and redefined constantly through the systems of education, the media along with competing ideologies, as if all vying to establish rules by which truth and falsity are determined (Heller, 1996). In other words, truth is identified with the effects of political power. This will explain why truth always revolves around a country's political economy and production of knowledge (ibid.). For example, Heller and others strongly argued that economic liberalism has become a technology of the modern state (ibid.).

4.4.4 Power and knowledge

Power and knowledge are synonymous in Foucault's epistemology; power is knowledge-based and even source of its generation and regeneration (Foucault, 1982). The power-knowledge conjoint denotes Foucault's understanding of the diffuse nature of the two concepts as an integrated unit. Heller (1996) noted that Foucault would not say much about knowledge as a subject though by implication, he referred to specialized knowledge basically. In relation to power therefore it is apparent that such knowledge appeals to a higher form of information (1996). Simply put, power for Foucault is based on knowledge and utilization of knowledge. Power reproduces knowledge by shaping it according to its anonymous intentions (Foucault, 2008). Power also creates or recreates its fields of exercise through knowledge (ibid.). Knowledge can never be neutral, rather it is the result of dynamic power relations underlying its discourse (Foucault, ibid.).

Why and how does power make use of knowledge? It serves the goals of those in authority. The state is the symbol and regulator of modern authority which, from a stance of the political economy, utilises information at its disposal to achieve its own goals (Foucault, 1982, p. 72). Such knowledge becomes the basis of 'truth' discourses that a state can exploit either for ungainly advantage or for productive ends (ibid., p.73). As said earlier, truth is identified with the effects of political power. Which is why they always revolve around a state's political economy and power discourses (ibid.).

But power has more potential for good than employed for ungainly advantage, Foucault argued. For example, he opposed the idea of repression because it is not the only effect of power. Not all relations are those of domination, he argued (1980). Power can be good when people accept it; when it "produces things, induces pleasure, forms

knowledge, produces discourse" (1980, p. 120). The negative effects of power have been demonstrated through power discourses historically, where certain psychiatric or sexual abnormalities were considered diseases for instance. Acknowledgment of its positive effect came up much later, with access to more knowledge and acknowledgement by the authorities. His strong allusion to knowledge as informed, ethical, and open to scrutiny contrasts with his view on 'ideology' which he described as any rigid settled notion of 'truth' (Foucault, 1981).

This power-knowledge understanding was later to be incorporated into Foucault's own constitution of the concept of governmentality, in which he elaborated further the role of the state from this perspective of rational government as an art form. As an art it is described as the organised practices through which subjects are governed (Mayhew, 2004); the art of government (Foucault, 1991); governmental rationality (Gordon, 1991); the techniques and strategies by which a society is rendered governable (Foucault, 2008). Researchers pointed to a certain point in Foucault's theoretical positioning in which neoliberalism provided a context for the ascent of liberal ideas and governments; hence the promotion of decentralized authority and responsible governance (Mayhew, ibid.). At this point, the idea is that governmentality is not limited to state politics alone, usually in its repressive form, but overall plays an integral role in societal systems of control, where institutions of knowledge contribute to providing better power discourses. The rationale is that with more advanced knowledge people can govern themselves better.

Foucault's association of governmentality with the term mentality, lends legitimacy to the notion of rationalising its exercise in society (Rose, 1996). Here all parties have come to a common understanding that power and knowledge can be shared, that social controls are necessary for the common good, and so on. Perhaps the more poignant part in this exercise is the appeal at the micro level of power, such as in human behaviour, in which government signifies problems of self-control, managing of households, also known as technologies of the self, in this shared understanding of human existence (Rose, 1996). To such extent, the moral and conduct of the soul too (Lemke, 2001).

4.4.5   Foucault and power relations

As stated earlier power according to Foucault exists only in relations. The old idea that power revolves around one person as in the metaphor of The Prince[24] was rejected by Foucault. The real difference came about with the launch of the modern state, as said earlier. It was at this stage that both economic and technological advancement came up with instruments of power that were able to redefine power relations on a whole new level. Power relations then came to be defined in terms of these techniques or power technologies, as Foucault would call them (1988). Utilised as a productive force, power then would come to redefine relations among people, people and the state, and so on. The question of who wields power is secondary because power is diffuse; each and everyone is an embodiment and vehicle of power in own capacity. Part of this utilization is to do with societal discipline.

In his investigation, Foucault made it clear his primary objective, that is, to provide a history of the different ways in which human beings were made subjects (Foucault, 1982). First, made subject to others by control and dependence. Secondly, in the sense that their own true identities are subjected by being tied to a specific identity through a conscience or self-knowledge (1982).[25] In his concrete example of the Panopticon[26] (refer page 80), the man-made structure signifies the power relations between the state and society. From its central observation tower, a warden can monitor each prisoner within their cells. The observer is positioned in such a way he only can see the prisoners. The prisoners know and have become aware they are being watched. 'Each prisoner is seen but does not see' (Foucault, 1991, p. 200). By becoming aware they are being monitored continually, they begin to regulate own conduct. Such awareness has more power of control than being locked up in cells or chains. Thus power relations from the authority's perspective is maintained even in the conscience of the prisoners (Foucault, 1991).

Putting the human body in the centre of his analysis, Foucault has given power relations its political framework and main point of reference (Kelly, 2014). The body is an

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[24] Attributed to Nicollo Machiavelli who penned the book of namesake.

[25] For the Samoans this specific identity is faaSamoa or the self-knowledge of belonging to this identity; it is tied through a strong self-awarenss of who they are as defined by their culture, internalized through social relations. As a result they are subjected to this identity conscientiously.

[26] Refer to image page 80 of a typical panopticon; its functions in the context of a prison ward are aligned with a traditional Samoan village own setup, the open fale make for easy surveillance of the whole community including tapu observance.

element to be managed in relation to strategies of the economic and social management of populations (Kelly, 2014). From such perspective, it is through this biological function that truly defines the reality of human existence, by which individuals seek own references of who they are outside and within themselves, towards others and the way they relate to power as its subjects and vehicles at the same time (ibid.).

By the same token, it makes meaning of the role of the state as a disciplinary force for the service of law and order; for national security and political stability. At this point in human history when the populace has become too dependent on the state's care and direction, so too are the risks attached to (Fukuyama, 2014). It is the moral duty of the state to minimise the threat of such risks for sake of good relations. Foucault referred to the subtle nature by which modern disciplinary techniques make 'disciplinary power' less ubiquitous and become normalized. On his/her part of the bargain, the average person, by his/her moral obligations as a citizen, is expected to provide resistance where relations are breached (1984).

In summary, all relations are power relations hence political (Foucault, 1991). Every society has own systems and networks of generating and maintaining these relations in their capacities as agents of power. Research on Pacific ethnographic history attested to this focus on the human body by Pacific Polynesians, in which three fundamental concepts - *va, tap*u and *mana*, all correlate in this human action. By employing Foucault's own inquiry lenses, both old Polynesia and a typical Pacific modern state tend to show parallels in this connection between the human body and political control (Mills, 2016; Maliko, 2012). Such control is discrete, perpetuated by society through own rituals and ideology, upon which the modern state reconstitute own forms of relations, through subtle and regulatory processes of modern power technologies (Foucault, 1991).

4.4.6 Power and resistance

Foucault talked about resistance in terms of struggles; three types of which he referred to historically: struggle against exploitation, against domination, and subjection. In his analysis of the struggle against subjection, the state is the central source of power. Foucault's stance is clear that there is resistance in the constitution of power. Since power exists in relations, there must be resistance also to involve (Foucault, 1991). For

him, such resistance is aimed against the objectivizing nature of power relations, by which man is turned into a subject for manipulation and control. These may be in the form of anti-authority struggles or asserting own right to be different (1991).

At the same time Foucault has impressed on the world his preference of power as a productive force, reminding them about the ubiquitous nature of power itself; the fact that it is diffuse and circulating, meaning that resistance against it is difficult. Since power as such spreads out across society it implies that any resistance against it must also be diffuse (Pickett, 1996). Pickett pointed out that since Foucault could see more good with the use of power than otherwise, his early stance on resisting authority seemed to have moderated obviously (ibid., p. 458).

4.5   Part 2. The concepts of power and state

The following sections discuss the two key concepts of power and state. To define the two concepts is challenging as it can be problematic (du Pisani, 2010); what has been accepted is a conventional interpretation from the standpoint of critical theory generally. I have assumed Foucault's discursive approach, meaning, the concern will mainly be on the question of how power behaves a certain way and less on a particular sociological definition (May, 2006; Taylor, 2011; Foucault, 1998).

4.5.1   The three models of power analysis

I follow the traditional arrangement of political theory under three model group-ings (Held, 2006; Connolly, 1995). These are 1. The pluralist models 2. The power elite and 3. The Marxist models. The pluralist models or pluralism are hinged on the question of how power is distributed. There is the notion that power is equally shared on the basis of a citizen's democratic rights to the electoral system and free participation in a country's politics. The idea that each and everyone plays a role regardless of class or status; that there is diversity in the relations of power, hence in groups people can bargain effectively with government and others regarding their interests. While there is inequality the system can sort things out somehow (Held, 2006; Krouse, 1983). The main criticism against pluralism is, there are groups which are more powerful and therefore influential in the relations; the chance of small groups in power bargaining is usually compromised. Sometimes the government, rather than being the referee on behalf of all interest groups, bow into the pressure from bigger and more powerful groups (Ellis, 1980).

Secondly, the power elite theory focuses on the question of how power is concentrated (Bottomore, 1993). The central argument is, power in a democracy is vested on just a few individuals, some of whom can be independent of democratic elections and who fashioned own agenda. Proponents of the power elite theory argue that society has an elite group who exert significant power over the corporate and government. Simply, the power elite theory opposes pluralist models for their narrow views of power in demo-cratic spaces, especially the notion that all individuals and groups share equal power. In its labelling democracy as a utopian folly, the power elite theory argues that democracy is unrealizable within capitalism basically (Merkel, 2014). Mills (1956) pointed out three power groups: political, economic, and military whose leadership, through a process of rationalization generated a funnelling of overall power control into the hands

of a few (cited in Bottomore, 1993). Advocates of this theory use the American system as an example.

The third, Marxist models, also are interested in the question of the concentration of power. The basic assumption rests with economics and the relations of human labour and power, hence the role of capital and its reproduction in the equation. Such reproduction is a key feature of any capitalist structured society. The result is inevitable when one class dominates the means of production, generating an unequal distribution of power and a proletariat. Hence the call for political action. Underpinned in Marxist philosophy is the belief that under capitalism it is the ruling class that holds all the power economic and political. Relations of power are predominantly economic. Inequality is explained solely in economic terms. Criticisms against Marxism includes a narrow interpretation of social inequality, focusing only on the class divide (Held, 2006; Krouse, 1983).

4.5.2   The power concept: a historical overview

The old sovereign power lends us a perspective to the nature of power relations as it were. Power in the hands of one person (king), an elite (oligarchy) or family (dynasty) prevailed until the modern state came into being, and a rationale was sought to justify the new authority (Foucault, 1970). Historically, a uniform notion of power was propagated in the classic works of Niccolo Machiavelli (early 16th century), Thomas Hobbes, John Locke (mid-17th century), Karl Marx, Max Weber (19th century), and well into the 20th century   in the likes of Dahl (1957), Lukes (1977) and Giddens (1984) for example, who gave us a pro-Western outlook of the subject (Finkel & Brudny, 2012). Of lasting influence was Hobbes who represented the idea of power as hegemonic, causal and the need to surrender it over to the state (Clegg, 1989). Considering the risks of a natural state, it is for the good of a political community that it hands power over to a central authority who can exercise it for the common good, Hobbes argued. Power thus is presented as a position of will between the governor and governed; a societal contract that is necessary for its own protection from the threat of anarchy (Lloyd, 2009). John Locke considered power in a context of a strong and stable government for the security of the people and national interests (Aaron, 2001; Lloyd, 2009).

From a contractual to a 'bureaucratic' inspired model, Max Weber took the lead for the latter. Bureaucracy was a new form of organisation that replaced feudalism and patrimonialism; from kinship relations and patronage values, the new model was based on merits and rational values such as efficiency, according to Max Weber (Clegg, 1989). Bureaucratic models are goal-oriented and therefore far more effective as models of governance, he suggested. As a political theory, bureaucracy is a form of centralized management by the state or any governing authority (ibid.). It is the basis for a systematic formation of any organisation designed to ensure efficiency and economic effectiveness (ibid.). Weber's approach to power understanding was borne out of his interest in bureaucracy and the factor of domination involved (Clegg, 1989). Power relations for him is always from a position of dominance (parent-child, employer-employee, priest-parishioner relationship). Hence his take on organisational power is usually connected to the constitution of the modern state and the will of the rulers to activate power despite resistance to it (ibid.). In the name of a disciplinary society such power is justified, and people are tuned to behave accordingly. The system through its own mechanisms will internalize and rationalize discipline in people's thinking and behaviour (ibid.).

Weber argued that capitalism is well ingrained in bureaucratic Christianity, more importantly the evolvement of disciplinary power to become a fixture of the modern state. Disciplinary values thus as proposed by modern bureaucracy, can be traced back to old disciplinary systems practised by both secular and religious origins as mentioned. Ascetic Protestantism[27] was an example. Which is why discipline as such plays a crucial part in Weber's power relations. Foucault called these the technologies of power, the means by which a population is managed efficiently. Bartels (2014) argued about Weber's relevance to studying the modern bureaucracy and new forms of domination, particularly under the new phenomena of privatization and even deliberative democracy. Clegg (1989) pointed out the fact that it was Weber who first predicted the adverse power of the bureaucracy in the mechanization and routinization of human life; a type of power instrument that would sabotage new forms of democratic institutions (ibid.).

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[27] Researchers like Weber argued about the connection between religious ideas and the spirit of Capitalism. He wanted to understand how religious ideas were translated into maxims of everyday conduct. Idleness was despised and perceived as a sin by the church thus the ethic of labour and hard work was promoted. Through work discipline is applied on a large scale, in workplaces and organisations. Capitalism therefore becomes part of the modern church narrative. Marx could only see the economic exploitation of workers through the relations of power in the system. Bourdieu talked about symbolic power in group culture as the means to perpetuate capitalist values. Foucault can trace modern discipline back to Ascetic Protestantism and the emergence of Capitalism in Europe (SparkNotesLLC; Oxford Reference).

The ultimate task of a punitive bureaucracy is to control the minds, bodies, attitudes, and behaviours of the workers (O'Neill, 1986). This argument would become more prominent in power discourse in the works of Foucault (ibid.).

Power as both overt and covert or the two faces of power, was identified with the works of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) who studied the two ways of making decisions by those in authority; was developed further by Lukes (1974) with his notion of a third dimension (Sadan, 1997). Lukes surmised that such a dimension is the most difficult to discover; the fact that people are made to succumb mentally to upholding interests which are not their own. This is power at work in a very covert way (Clegg, 1989). The implication for Lukes was, unless the people see beyond the two dimensions to discover (understand fully) an entire political agenda, then they are bound to be blindsided. Gaventa (2003) proposed a three-dimensional theory of power and powerlessness. His work focused on the phenomenon of quiescence, 'the silent agreement in conditions of glaring inequality' (p. 3). The purpose of power he argued, is to prevent the rise in conflict against the rule of a social elite. The strategy is 'silent agreement' as mentioned. Thus, an apparent lack of conflict in a political domain is a sign of power mechanisms at work. Gaventa's theory complements Lukes (Clegg, 2006); powerlessness is the outcome of unilateral power usually exercised by an elite group in a very unequal society (ibid.).

Power as symbolic came to be identified more with the works of Bourdieu (1986) and his proponents. Bourdieu (1979) contested that cultural roles are far more dominant than economic forces in determining how hierarchies of power are situated and reproduced across societies. Thus, equated with symbolic power, described as the tacit almost unconscious domination of cultural/social modes in the everyday social habits (ibid.). Symbolic power accounts for the discipline in maintaining places in a social hierarchy, which explains the reality of power relations individually or through system institutions (Giddens, 1973). Hence Bourdieu's argument that misrecognition is universal (Riley, 2017). Upon Bourdieu Althusser suggested that state power is partly based on symbolic repression (Althusser, 1972). Weber (1968) too argued that social status is far more significant than a person's relations to the market. The honour and privilege of belonging to an esteemed group may become the means by which power is acquired and or exercised (Ritzer, 2013).

Gramsci on the other hand looked at symbolic power in the prism of the concept 'cultural hegemony.' Focus is on a society's culture and the way it is manoeuvred politically by a dominant group, with the aim to establish new norms, hence the determining role of ideology in this transformation. Ideology in the forms of beliefs, values, mores, artefacts are all part of a symbolic representation of hegemonic power. These are tacitly accepted or appreciated, like the privileges of belonging to a group. On the positive, people with limited power may form powerful groups to gain a greater share over economic and other state resources (Ritzer, 2013). Gramsci believed that through democracy the people can deliver counterhegemony effectively for their own benefit.

Power as legitimation of authority was the priority of others. Weber's notion of legitimate authority rests on his understanding of the power concept. Power is a factor of domination; it is based on economic or authoritarian interests (Weber, 1988; Sadan, 1997). Political domination has been justified based on three criteria. First, traditional authority or the authority of the 'eternal yesterday, the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform' (Weber, ibid; 1919, p. 78). Second, charismatic, by which a person distinguishes himself/ herself as an authority figure in leadership or show of extraordinary *mana* or skill. Thirdly, rational/legal. This authority is validated by virtue of rules or the rationale of being governed by laws. The three types of power legitimation interact in most governing systems and political environments. French and Raven (1959) included legitimation in their five bases of power. The five bases are coercive, reward, legitimate, referent and expert. Raven later added the sixth base in information power.[28] Legitimate power is derived from the consent of a group to bestow authority on a person to do a task or perform a certain role basically. Elections are ways by which modern societies do so for politics. Saying that, legitimate power is nuanced and contextual. All the five bases may be considered legitimate in each own right at any given context, as long as society agrees, even if their rationale for doing so may be anything but rational. Reciprocity for example may be part of a legitimation value in certain societies but is considered illegitimate in others. The same can be said about secular values proposed by the state as opposed to the value systems of minority groups.

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[28] While information power is another form of power according to Raven (1965), Foucault is noted for not distinguishing between power and knowledge. The power of information as knowledge is the monopoly of the state (Foucault, 1976).

Foucault talked about the 'logic of government', meaning that the bureaucrats and political leaders are the shapers of such logic (Foucault, 2008).[29] The relevance of having an efficient system and a strong government is reinforced by a knowledge regime that is under the control of the state. Truth is derived from an official corpus of knowledge appropriated by the state and declared as society's own. Such a monopoly on knowledge forms the very basis of legitimation, the justifiable notion that the state knows better (Ibid.). Foucault believed that the state has the means of control (technologies of power such as techniques to utilize knowledge) to increase and perpetuate its hold on the people. The art of governmentality is a Foucaultian reference to such capability of the state to maintain control. With the emergence of the welfare state and its capacity to provide both political stability and the people's social welfare/well-being, their right to govern is well justified.

In his reconceptualising of power as a dichotomy between domination and empower-ment, Haugaard suggested a four-dimensional approach (2012). He argued that the normative processes such as Luke's three-dimensional power (power over) have the potential to be emancipating (power to). Hence the need for a fourth dimension, he argued. Such a dimension has the potential to be accommodating of both. This includes seeking fresh interpretations that relate to new political realities (ibid.). Hence the idea of   power as a deal in human relations was sustained in terms of its empowering appeal (Evans, 1997). A reciprocal nature of human relations is said to be the underlying thread in describing power over and power to (Lewin, 1997). For the proponents of the relational approach to power, such understanding is the key to unlocking the rationale of power itself (Guzinni, 2005). Power hence is perceived as accommodating because it is relational.

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[29]In Theory Culture and Society 26 (6):78-108, 2008.

The basic argument is that relational power enables 'personhood' and communities, as opposed to unilateral power that undermines. Mesle (2016) summed it up in terms of three capacities: 1. the ability to be actively and intentionally open to the world around us; 2. the capacity to create ourselves out of relationships with others; and 3. the ability to sustain internal relationships, to influence others by having first been influenced by them. Such an approach to power leads to richer lives and more creative relationships, not to mention good government (Mesle, ibid.).

Many agreed that with Foucault, a shift in power understanding had taken on a whole new level of interpretation (Clegg, 2006). As described already, his notion of power as encompassing, all-pervading, free of any agency or source was a radical departure from the traditional consensus. Foucault premised that 'power is everywhere', 'comes from everywhere' so in this sense is neither an agency nor a structure (Foucault, 1998, p. 63). Power is in the very fabric of our existence. There is this new understanding of power as diffuse, relational and can be utilized for the common good ultimately (ibid.).

How do we understand power? Proponents of critical theory agreed that language is the key. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) places language in the centre of their analytic activity. Language, they argued, is synonymous with power understanding, which is why the focus must be on how a language is used or made to work, particularly by those in power (van Dijk, 2004). In the language are traced hidden power relations which stand for inequality and dispossession (Fairclough, 1989). Fairclough posited that language is made to work for the purpose of maintaining and changing power relations. The people need to understand the intricacies of these processes so that they can put up resistance and ultimately change society for the better (ibid.). The linguistic cultural capital can be a monopoly of the power elite thus making a political discourse powerful in the sponsored activities of a political state or religious government for that matter (Foucault, 1980).

Habermas (1981) argued that because language is the foundational component of society, he proposed that human action and understanding be analysed for their linguistic structure and reference to freedom (1981). In his rereading of Weber's view of rationality or the latter's rather limited interpretation of human action, Habermas (ibid.) contended that freedom and the reconciling features of a culture need to be read into the analysis of power. Hence the term, 'emancipatory communicative action' (ibid.). The task of understanding power in such intricacies of language is still evolving, though overall, the likes of Habermas were more optimistic than the Webers of academia, on the potential of human action to make power a medium for doing good (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).

Powerhouse 1. Featuring the panopticon, symbol of state power pervading all spheres of society as modelled in prison life, the optimization of power using technology and a subtle political strategy to which Foucault has given the name – biopower.

Source: theguardian.com

Powerhouse 2. Samoan version. No walls to divide, a typical Samoan meeting house
 (fale fono) is open, its situation is right in the midst of the village, meaning that politics is not a secretive business but shared with the community through family representatives.
Village power pervades the whole through the fa'amatai and all members of the community that monitor the entry and exit from within the houses and from outside and every corner unobstructed.

Source: AJ Tattersall